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ABSTRACT. Historians of sharecropping in France have usually emphasized its
negative effects on growth and on the workers’ welfare. However, from about 1840
the regions of central and western France, regions where sharecroppers were
especially numerous, were also areas that saw great improvements and the special
ization in commercial livestock. As the author shows, landowners from these areas
used sharecropping contracts in order both to seize the opportunities given by the
potential scale economies in livestock rearing and to take advantage of family labour
at a time of increasing wages. After presenting some basic data regarding share
cropping contracts, the second section is intended to describe the improvements in
livestock farming in the area under sharecropping after 1840 and the contribution of
landowners. Section III offers an explanation of why landowners preferred share
cropping to fixed rent contracts. Three causes in particular are identified: (i) a lack
of physical and human capital sufficient to allow potential farmers to engage in large
scale farming; (ii) the contribution of landlord managerial expertise; and (iii) the
fact that the complexity of mixed farming required a quality of work that would have
been too expensive with wage labour. In a final section the ways in which the success
of sharecropping minimized transaction costs are discussed.
The persistence of sharecropping in nineteenth and twentieth century
France has been seen as a symbol of the damaging role of inefficient
agricultural contracts and traditional customs in French agrarian devel
opment. Most contemporaries complained about the poverty of share
croppers, the prevalence of subsistence crops, the use of slow and
inefficient draft oxen instead of horses and the poor working conditions.
The absence of incentives and the under investment in equipment by
landowners and sharecroppers have also been advanced as explanations
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to explain the low productivity.1 Contemporaries also stressed the laziness
ofme´tayers (sharecroppers) and their resistance to innovation.Nineteenth
century surveys show that illiteracy rates in departments where the con
tract was prevalent were higher than in other areas. The persistence of
sharecropping and the predominance of owner occupiers were features
of the slow structural change that supposedly explains France’s poor
agricultural performance before the Second World War.2
More recently, and by contrast, it is the rationality of sharecropping
that has been the focus of increasing interest for institutional economists.
Landowners might prefer sharecropping contracts to rental contracts in
situations where farming carried unusually high levels of risk, where
tenants were poor and where credit markets were imperfect. This was not
just because tenants with rental contracts were likely to default, but also
because sharecropping contracts gave landowners the necessary protection
to risk lending their tenants the draught animals necessary for cultivation.3
The contract would also be preferred in supervision intensive crops to
prevent mismanagement of land and capital specific to it, such as build
ings, vineyards or trees. Adrien de Gasparin in 1832 argued that this
explained the prevalence of sharecropping in the prosperous area of
vineyards, olives and fruits in the South of France.4 However, farms cul
tivated by sharecroppers in central and western France were much criti
cized from the mid nineteenth century for their low levels of investment
and the poor technical preparation of the tenants. This negative view of
sharecropping was contrasted with the supposedly highly successful
capitalist farms of northern France. In fact, this argument conceals the
fact that from about 1840 the regions of central and western France, such
as the Bourbonnais, the Limousin orMaine regions where sharecroppers
were especially numerous were also areas that saw great improvements
and a specialization in commercial livestock oriented to urban markets.
Though it is true that farmers also produced a wider range of products
that included grains and forage, a progressively larger share of marketable
products came from livestock farming. The fact that a large proportion of
sharecroppers’ farms were of medium to large size (called me´tairies),5 in a
context of substantial peasant holdings, led contemporaries to debate
whether the fixed rent tenancy contract, as found in northern France and
in England, would not be better for large scale cultivation.
The historical experience is important for explaining the persistence of
sharecropping, as it was the predominant contract south of the Loire
around 1700.6 However, its decline started before the end of the eighteenth
century, and there is evidence that the adoption of sharecropping con
tracts or the renewal of existing ones in the nineteenth century played a
major role in the diffusion of mixed husbandry techniques on the larger
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farms, in the same way as fixed rent tenancy did in northern France. As
I will show, landowners from central and western France used share
cropping contracts in order to seize both the opportunities given by
potential economies of scale in livestock rearing, and to take advantage of
family labour at a time of increasing wages. In this article I examine only
livestock specialization on the large farms because, although the majority
of farmers produced a wide range of products (including pork, poultry
and wool), beef was by far the most important.
I
It is only possible to get an accurate picture of the extent and evolution of
land tenure in France from the mid nineteenth century on. As can be seen
in Figure 1, the percentage of holdings in sharecropping stayed at around
a tenth of all farms during the nineteenth century, and then declined
slowly during the first half of the twentieth century. The number of
holdings fell from 400,000 in 1852 to 260,000 in 1929, with the farm area
covered by the contract falling from 14 to 11 per cent during the same
period. Sharecropping was the most common tenancy contract in several
areas south of the Loire, and was completely absent in the North and
North east. For many contemporaries of the 1850s the persistence of
sharecropping was seen as a problem, and an obstacle to agricultural
improvements, in a period of rapid modernization.7 The main criticism
was its inefficiency compared to fixed rent contracts. Straightforward
evidence of the superiority of the latter was, as many argued, the poverty
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F IGURE 1. Sharecropping in France, 1862 1946 (in % of holdings and acreage).
(Sources: Ministe`re de l’Agriculture, du Commerce et des Travaux Publiques, Re´sultats
ge´ne´raux (Strasbourg, 1868); Statistique Internationale de l’Agriculture (Nancy, 1876);
Ministe`re de l’Agriculture, Re´sultats ge´ne´raux de l’enqueˆte de´cennale de 1882 (Nancy, 1882);
Ministe`re de l’Agriculture, Re´sultats de l’enqueˆte de´cennale de 1892 (Nancy, 1897); Ministe`re
de l’Agriculture, Statistique agricole de la France: re´sultats ge´ne´raux de l’enqueˆte de 1929
(Paris, 1929); Institut National de la Statistique et des E´tudes E´conomiques, Recensement
ge´ne´ral de la population effectue´ le 10 mars 1946, vol. VII (Paris, 1950).)
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of the South west compared to the prosperous North, where the contract
had been completely absent for at least a century.8 Whereas those farmers
paid a fixed rent in money, and therefore had more incentive to allocate
resources and effort on their farms so as to maximize their income,
sharecroppers had less incentive to maximize their effort (and landlords to
contribute capital), since they received in return only half of the output.9
Moreover, landlords were supposedly reluctant to provide expensive
machinery or buildings to poor and illiterate tenants, a rational response
that would jeopardize land improvements.10This was considered especially
problematic in a period when ‘l’agriculture ame´liore´ ’ (the new husbandry)
was becoming more capital intensive.11 By contrast, sharecropping was
defended in periods of crisis, such as during the last decades of the nine
teenth century or the 1930s, as a way to rescue farmers from the threat of
bankruptcy.12 However, the defenders of sharecropping were generally
more concerned with its social and moral advantages, rather than any
economic ones.13
In the last few decades an increasing number of theoretical economists
have tried to understand the rationale of contract choice, especially the
question of why a supposedly inefficient institution such as sharecropping
was so widespread (see the article by Giovanni Federico in this issue). The
poverty of potential farmers in a risky activity and the absence, or the
imperfection, of credit markets might explain why landowners preferred
a share contract to a fixed rent as a way to assure rent payment from
poor tenants, while at the same time providing the livestock necessary to
cultivate the land. As Philip Hoffman has observed, this helps explain the
presence of the contract in poor areas in early modern France, as well as in
developing countries today.14 But the presence of sharecropping can be
explained for completely different reasons, namely as a way to mitigate
opportunistic behaviour with crops such as vines, olives or permanent tree
crops, because tenants with a fixed rent contract would be tempted to
increase their short term output by running down the capital invested.15
Moreover, other aspects of the contract can reduce transaction costs and
Marshallian inefficiencies. For example, a long term relationship between
the principal and the agent (here the landlord and the tenant farmer) has
the virtue of allowing commitment by both parties to comply with the
contract through the mechanism of reputation, making it as efficient as
fixed rent farming.16 In the case of early modern France, poverty might
explain the presence of sharecropping in the South west of the country,
and viticulture its existence in many parts of the South. But are the same
explanations valid in France in more recent times?
If the tenant’s poverty explains the traditional presence of share
cropping, the subsequent increase in wages and overall prosperity of
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French agriculture after 1850 would, in theory, have seen sharecroppers
climb the farming ladder and switch to fixed rent contracts. In addition
the growth in farm servants’ and labourers’ savings might allow them to
buy their own land and animals.17 Indeed, many sharecroppers did move
to fixed rent contracts during the nineteenth century. But this process
concerned mostly the smallest share tenants called bordiers or closiers in
central and western France.18 Indirect evidence from government inquiries
confirms this trend. The inquiries distinguish between two different classes
of sharecropping contract : tenants with no other source of income (pure
sharecroppers) and tenants who also cultivated their own land (mixed
tenures) and who often farmed much smaller units. Whereas the number
of pure sharecropping remained at around 200,000 between 1862 and
1929, mixed tenures diminished from 193,000 to 67,000 over the same
period (see Figure 1). In 1929, the size of farms in share tenancy was
consistently larger than with any other class of tenure, about twice the
average between 1882 and 1929, with the exception of the South east and
those regions that specialized in vines. The 1946 farm census identifies
both type of contract and size of holding, at a lower administrative level
than the department (the re´gion agricole). A sample of re´gions agricoles
where sharecropping was common shows not only that farms were com
paratively large but that in these regions landowners everywhere preferred
this type of contract for their largest farms (see Table 1).19 Most areas
included in the sample had a much larger proportion of sharecropping
contracts than the rest of the country, but even in regions where the
contract was less predominant, such as Bas Berry or Boischaut Sud, (with
9 and 8 per cent of their total agricultural area in sharecropping), most of
the largest farms were leased to sharecroppers. The average size of a
typical me´tairie was between 25 and 60 hectares, equivalent to a medium
size holding. However, at the end of the nineteenth century, only 6.8 per
cent of French farms were above 30 hectares.20 Therefore, it seems likely
that economies of scale played a significant role in explaining contract
choice, and landowners preferred to lease their largest farms to share
croppers rather than fragmenting them into smaller units.
As I have noted, both agronomists and economists have also argued
that certain kinds of crops help explain the presence of sharecropping. A
survey on sharecropping in France in 1953 devotes almost half its space
to vineyards, given the wide variety of clauses included in the different
contracts. Sharecropping contracts were very common in almost every
area with vineyards, especially in Cognac (Charentes), Armagnac (Gers)
and Valle´e de la Loire (Maine et Loire, Loire Infe´rieure) and Coˆtes
Chalonnaise, Maˆconnaise, Beaujolais (Saoˆne et Loire, Loire, Rhoˆne).21
Resin was another crop that explains the persistence of one of the largest
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areas of sharecropping in France before the Second World War, being
found in the huge pine forests of the Landes (Landes and Gironde in the
South west).22 However, as Table 2 shows, in 1892 (the date of the only
agricultural inquiry which specifies tenure by crops), with the exception of
the South east, vineyards made up only a tiny share of the cultivated land
in sharecropping (3.94 per cent). Arable land, producing mainly cereals
and fodder (78.3 per cent) and pasture (16.99 per cent) were much more
common, and explaining why sharecropping was usually associated by
contemporaries with ‘polyculture’ in the twentieth century.23 Instead, for
many, ‘polyculture’ was used as a synonym for small scale self sufficient
farming, employing family labour (‘polyculture familiale ’). This, in turn,
explains the supposed lack of specialization of risk averse peasants and
the persistence of traditional tendency technology.24 In fact, it is true
that most farmers grew a wide variety of products and that most were
TABLE 1
A breakdown of large farms by tenurial contract in sample ‘re´gions agri
coles ’ from the Centre west and South west of France in 1946
Re´gion agricole
(de´partement)
Average size
of the largest
farms
(hectares)
Owner
cultivation
(%)
Fixed-
rent
farming
(%)
Share-
cropping
(%)
% of total
area in
share-
cropping
Centre-West
Coteaux (Allier) 53.9 14 26 60 25
Forterre (Allier) 47.4 11 29 59 32
Confolentais (Charente) 74.9 21 10 67 27
Aunis (Charente Maritime) 57.3 32 31 36 10
Marche (Cher) 58.9 22 13 63 12
Bas Berry (Creuse) 55.9 14 12 72 9
Bocage (Vende´e) 48.9 6 40 53 19
Montmorillon (Vienne) 63.2 19 13 64 25
Basse Marche (Hte Vienne) 90.8 10 2 84 25
Bourboˆnnais (Saoˆne-et-Loire) 57.2 11 40 47 23
Boischaut Sud (Indre) 133.2 29 25 46 8
Gatine (Indre-et-Loire) 91.4 22 21 52 22
Elevage (Mayenne) 38.2 12 47 40 22
South-west
Thore (Tarn) 78.5 25 17 54 24
Lauragais (Hte.Garonne) 42.9 21 11 65 40
Ht.Armagnac (Gers) 43.7 49 10 40 21
Sources : Institut National de la Statistique et des E´tudes E´conomiques, Recensement
ge´neral de la population effectue´ le 10 mars 1946, vol. VII (Paris, 1950).
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consumed on the farm, but the largest ones engaged in commercial live
stock rearing. As we will see, not only were the largest farms producing
mainly meat, but livestock specialization was mainly a sharecropper’s
activity. 25 The contract was especially important in France’s three large
cattle rearing areas : the old provinces of Berry (Allier, Cher, Indre and
Nivernais and the western part of Saoˆne et Loire), the Limousin
and Poitou (mainly Haute Vienne, Creuse, Vienne and the Charentes)
and Maine and northern Anjou (Mayenne, Maine et Loire). These con
stituted around 45 per cent of the area under sharecropping in France in
1929, most of them in large me´tairies.26
I I
As Table 3 shows, in 1840 labour productivity in the areas where share
cropping was widespread was well below the French average.27 These
departments, in part because of the absence of good communication net
works, were mostly marginal areas, especially the districts that where
dominated by large me´tairies. But geographical factors were also
important for two other reasons: the high clay content of the soil raised
the draft animal and labour requirements in cultivation and also lowered
yields.28 Land could be improved by marling, liming and draining, but
these operations required high levels of investment that only market
TABLE 2
Land use on sharecropping farms in France in 1892 (%)
Arable Pasture Vines
Market
gardens
Loire 78.47 19.07 1.40 1.06
Poitou-Charentes 82.53 15.19 1.73 0.55
Limousin 67.00 32.28 0.17 0.55
Centre 80.39 16.74 2.34 0.52
Aquitaine 75.98 16.68 6.32 1.03
Midi (+Aude) 80.37 11.33 7.72 0.58
Rhone 77.36 12.76 8.65 1.23
Provence 75.32 11.14 11.99 1.55
Languedoc ( Aude) 76.50 12.82 9.40 1.28
France 78.30 16.99 3.94 0.77
France all tenures 74.53 18.90 5.20 1.37
Sources : Ministe`re de l’Agriculture, Re´sultat de l’enqueˆte de´cennal de 1892 (Strasbourg,
1897).
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TABLE 3
Livestock production, and labour productivity in 14 de´partements with a high proportion of sharecropping, 1840 1911
De´partements (main cattle breed)
% livestock meat in
agricultural production
% meat in total
agricultural production
Production per
active male
Livestock per active
male (France 100) Land in
sharecropping
in 1882 (%)1840 1892 1840 1892 1840 1911 1840 1892
Centre
Allier (Charolaise) 8.2 21.7 21.0 36.7 60 134 88 161 41
Cher (Charolaise) 6.2 15.1 13.7 27.7 133 122 176 108 35
Saoˆne-et-Loire (Charolaise) 8.5 15.8 21.4 30.8 97 95 121 124 18
Nie`vre (Charolaise) 9.0 16.3 15.5 37.5 72 107 95 119 14
Limousin-Poitou-Vende´e
Corre`ze (Limousine) 6.8 12.1 22.2 34.2 51 78 74 83 29
Vienne, Haute (Limousine) 8.2 19.6 23.8 39.2 65 81 106 115 39
Vende´e (Parthenaise) 9.0 17.8 14.7 25.5 112 74 99 134 33
Vienne (Parthenaise) 5.4 11.9 14.7 25.5 68 112 91 91 30
Loire
Mayenne (Shorthorn-Mancelle) 9.2 19.8 15.6 29.5 74 88 142 183 23
Maine-et-Loire (Shorthorn-Mancelle) 6.5 18.4 12.9 27.0 110 92 102 143 19
South-west
Gers (Gasconne) 6.1 13.9 12.6 26.4 73 82 74 86 19
Lot-et-Garonne (Garonnaise) 7.0 16.5 14.8 28.7 92 84 97 113 34
Tarn (Garonnaise) 4.6 13.4 16.4 35.1 81 108 80 109 34
Tarn-et-Garonne (Garonnaise) 5.7 14.8 12.4 28.5 76 109 74 79 25
Average 14 de´partaments 7.2 16.2 16.6 30.9 83 98 101 118 28
France 4.9 11.8 10.0 23.7 100 100 100 100 14
Sources : Jean-Claude Toutain, La production agricole de la France de 1810 a` 1990: de´partements et re´gions. Croissance, productivite´, structures
(Grenoble, 1988), 868–71.
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opportunities would make profitable. Secondly, summer drought south of
the Loire explains the absence of natural and permanent pasture. Both
factors explain the high proportion of arable land in low quality cereals
such as rye and the large allocation of land left fallow a third of the
arable land of the Limousin as late as 1862. Chestnuts still provided a
quarter of the rural population’s food intake at the end of the eighteenth
century.29 The poverty of the area explains why animals were poorly fed,
and also their low weight.30 Only in a few specific areas did farmers have
enough feed to fatten their livestock properly, but they were normally
finished in Normandy or Charollais, where there were plentiful pastures.
During the second quarter of the nineteenth century two factors pre
sented new opportunities for increasing production and productivity
in these areas. A growing urban demand caused meat prices to double
between 1850 and 1874, providing a strong incentive to specialize in live
stock.31 At the same time, the large programme of building rural roads
that started in 1836 and railway construction not only allowed better access
to urban markets, but also considerably lowered the cost of imported
inputs (such as marl or lime), giving considerable incentives to special
ization in cattle rearing. However, and in contrast to England, over a large
tract of the country, and especially in the South, oxen were still used both
as work animals and for meat. The fact that oxen and cows were slaugh
tered only after a long and hard working life (eight to twelve years was the
norm) led to their meat being of very low quality.32 When meat started to
become more profitable, contemporaries looked at the British model of
cattle rearing. In particular, the influential agronomist One´sime Delafond
suggested in 1846 the need to introduce three features of British livestock
rearing into France. First he encouraged the importation of new breeds
from England, particularly the shorthorn the most successful British
breed which allowed faster growth and fattening. Delafond also stressed
the need to introduce horses in the southern France as work animals,
thereby allowing specialization and improving the supply and quality of
beef. Finally, he believed that it was crucial to feed animals with a better
and cheaper feed.33 However, a large proportion of the cattle slaughtered
more than half a century later were still old draft animals. This lack of
specialization proved to have some advantages, such as lower costs of
rearing livestock, as farmers could benefit from the manure and work
of their animals. Moreover, there was still a certain consensus in France
that work animals that had been well fed and reared over five or six years
produced meat of good quality.34 One of the reasons was the way that the
meat was prepared for consumption; as late as 1890 many consumers
were still stewing or boiling their meat rather than grilling it, and this
suited older beasts.35 Contemporaries found that the shorthorn’s meat
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had too much fat, and were willing to pay more for the persille´meat (meat
with fat marbled in it) that came from the Limousin.36
By the turn of the twentieth century farmers were beginning to change
the way that beef was produced. First, the working life of draft livestock
was shortened so that by 1912 four or five years of light work before
slaughter were common, instead of the ten that had been the norm a
century earlier.37 Secondly, stock was improved through better breeding
and the introduction of English cattle, such as the shorthorn (or ‘Durham’,
as it was called in France).38 Growers crossed their local breeds with the
shorthorn (the ‘Charolaise’, for instance) or simply improved their ani
mals, as ‘Limousine’ or ‘Parthenaise ’. 39 Even if most French breeders
were still primarily interested in cattle’s aptitude for work, by the late
nineteenth century the best animals were bigger, and produced more meat
(70 per cent meat instead of 45 per cent a few decades earlier) and they
fattened faster. Simultaneously, as in England, French breeders started to
create herd books, in order to guarantee the purity of the breed. 40 Finally,
growers increased the output of feed. The introduction of the railways
allowed them to marl more cheaply and thereby to reduce the share of
fallow land and to reallocate the land gained to the production of forage.
This increased the livestock carrying capacity of the land and, as a result,
the quantity of dung that was produced to improve soil fertility and raise
grain yields. The introduction of marl facilitated the conversion of
manure into nitrogen and allowed a shift from subsistence cereals to wheat
that could be sold, together with the cultivation of root crops or fodder
that was fed to cattle. The absence of good pasture during the summer was
partially solved with the introduction of irrigation on pastures in the
Bourbonnais, the Limousin and Anjou.41
These improvements demandedhuge investments in drainage, irrigation,
marling, stalls for animals and new buildings. A detailed report published
by Jean Augustin Barral in 1884 on irrigation in almost a hundred
properties located in the Limousin underlines the high level of this capital
investment.42 On several occasions, landowners made explicit the distance
of their property from the main road and markets, and how railway
building provided an incentive to invest in and to reorganize farms. Most
farmers had to build reservoirs and to pipe water from rivers (or other
sources) to their pastures. Many farms brought water from one or two
kilometres away, and invested as much as the price of the land itself.43 The
building of new barns and stalls was also very costly, once more requiring
as much capital as the value of the land itself.44 Dressing with marl and
lime allowed new land to be cultivated, as well as the reorganization of
crop rotations. Similar changes had taken place earlier in other regions
such as Mayenne, the Bourbonnais (Allier) or the Vende´e.45
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Table 3 shows the results of these major improvements and how most
of these areas had reduced the differences in male labour productivity
compared to the French average by 1892.46 The shift to meat production
(including pork and mutton) was very important, and represented an
increase of from 17 per cent to 31 per cent of total production. In some
cases, such as the Allier or Vienne, where the presence of sharecropping
was particularly high, yields increased and specialization was even more
spectacular. In 1840, labour productivity in these two departments was
below the national average, but by 1892 it was above the average. It is not
possible to know to what extent the improvements were due to share
cropping and cattle raising, since the unit of analysis, the department,
aggregates different agricultural areas. However contemporary studies
appear to support the idea that sharecropping made an important con
tribution. Barral shows many examples of animal or grain production
doubling or tripling as a result of improvements made before the 1880s.47
Garidel provides similar data for the same period in the Allier and
Mayenne.48One consequence of the growth in output was that land prices,
were much more resilient than in other areas. In 1914 Caziot, in a com
prehensive study of French land prices identified the Bourbonnais as one
of the few zones where prices had not fallen in the previous forty years.49
Even the Limousin and Poitou showed a small increase in the price of land
compared to a fall of 25 to 50 per cent in the main areas of livestock
specialization in Normandy, where sharecropping contracts were not
used.50
I I I
It is possible to identify three main reasons that explain why landowners
and fermiers ge´ne´raux (‘ farmers general ’, or fixed rent farmers ; see
below) continued to use share contracts rather than leases of land to fixed
rent tenants. The first concerns the absence of sufficient physical
and human capital in the form of potential farmers to cultivate large
holdings. Most of the improvements mentioned earlier took place in
previously marginal and isolated areas, where farmers, as data on illiter
acy suggest, probably lacked the necessary skills and information
required for introducing technological change. This could explain,
secondly, the choice of a contract such as sharecropping which allowed
landlords to supply the necessary managerial expertise. And thirdly, the
complexity of mixed farming required a quality of work and certain
organizational skills that would have been too expensive with wage labour.
Family labour, as in the case of owner occupiers, was therefore most
appropriate.
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‘Me´tairies ’ and access to capital
The capital constraint hypothesis asserts that imperfect or missing capital
markets explained the spread of share contracts.51 Landlords provided
loans and livestock to poor tenants who lacked farm equipment and
working capital because they were unable to get loans on the capital
market. For French contemporaries, this hypothesis was also the
favourite explanation for the absence of the fixed rent contract in the
Centre and most of the West and South west.52 As I have noted, share
croppers often had large farms and the capital requirements for livestock
on a modern farm of 30 80 hectares could easily reach 6,000 24,000
TABLE 4
Sharecroppers’ capital in 1875 (in French Francs)
De´pastement
(re´gion agricole) Livestock Machinery
Total
capital
Hectares
per farm
Capital
per hectare
Centre-west
Allier (Centre) 10,000 1,500 11,500 55 209
Cher (Centre) 10,000 2,500 12,500 80 156
Indre (Centre) 8,000 500 8,500 70 121
Indre-et-Loire (Centre) 5,500 3,000 8,500 45 189
Mayenne (Loire) 8,000 5,000 13,000 30 433
Corre`ze (Limousin) 3,500 1,000 4,500 35 129
Vende´e (Loire) n/a n/a 7,000 30 233
(Charentes) 10,000 4,000 14,000 70 200
Charente (Charentes) 2,000 400 2,400 40 60
Vienne (Poitou) 6,000 6,000 50 120
Vienne, Haute (Limousin) 7,000 3,000 10,000 35 286
Correze (Bas Limousin) 2,250 400 2,650 20 133
South-west
Dordogne (Aquitaine) 3,000 700 3,700 30 123
Garonne, Haute (Midi) 3,000 1,200 4,200 18 233
Gers (Midi) 5,000 900 5,900 30 197
Landes (Aquitaine) 2,250 1,450 3,700 16 231
Lot (Midi) 6,000 1,200 7,200 30 240
Lot-et-Garonne (Midi) 3,000 500 3,500 18 194
Pyrene´es, Basses (Aquitaine) 1,750 850 2,600 10 260
Pyre´ne´es, Hautes (Midi) 4,000 n/a 4,000 30 133
Tarn-et-Garonne (Midi) 2,500 900 3,400 18 189
South-east
Var 2,500 1,000 3,500 20 175
n/a no data available.
Sources : Comte de Tourdonnet, Situation du me´tayage en France: rapport sur l’enqueˆte
ouvert par la Socie´te´ des Agriculteurs de France (Paris, 1879 1880).
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French francs (FF) in 1880, averaging between 60 and 433 FF per hectare
(see Table 4).53 Landless tenants had limited access to credit markets as
their assets were meagre or difficult to use as collateral. Even the large
farmers of northern France, better endowed with capital and with special
access to credit markets, found it increasingly difficult to obtain finance in
the last quarter of the nineteenth century.54 The only way to accumulate
capital was by way of a formal entitlement, included in all sharecropping
contracts, which enabled tenants to get a share of any increment in the
stock. The mid nineteenth century literature often identifies the
advantages of sharecropping for landless labourers wishing to climb the
farming ladder. A popular book for students in rural primary schools
emphasized the success of a poor sharecropper called Grand Jacquet, who
was finally able to purchase his farm after twenty years of hard work.55
But there is evidence to suggest that it was difficult for sharecroppers to
accumulate sufficient capital to stock a farm for themselves. For example,
the Comte de Tourdonnet complained that sharecroppers usually owned
less than a fifth of the total stock.56 Even within the favourable figures
offered by Garidel for a large farm in the Allier, a sharecropper was able
to save 3,600 FF, equivalent to only a quarter of the value of the livestock
required for the holding after 23 years on the same farm (1856 1879).57
Nevertheless, this was also equivalent to the price of 2.5 to 3 hectares of
land in 1879, and would enable tenants to gain their independence,
through purchase, as was frequently the case.58 This possibility increased
in the 1860s and 1870s, with higher meat prices, and during the First
World War, because of inflation. By contrast, sharecroppers found it
harder in periods of low prices.59 As sharecroppers became able to buy
their own farms, landowners had to look once more for new tenants with
no capital or stock.60
If capital constraints precluded the possibility of leasing land to inde
pendent farmers, why did landlords not split their land into smaller
holdings? In France, peasant farming with holdings of 5 to 30 hectares
increased in numbers until the end of the nineteenth century, whereas the
number of farms of over 40 hectares decreased.61 A survey concluded that
small farms were increasing their share of agricultural land in more than
half of departments, especially in the South, as late as the first decade of
the twentieth century.62 Moreover, as Levy has shown for England in the
nineteenth century, livestock husbandry was associated with much smaller
farms than was the case for cereal farming.63 One explanation is related to
geographical factors : marginal land was often difficult to cultivate with
only a couple of cows, the only work animals small farmers normally
had.64 But the answer is more closely related to the economies of scale re
quired for livestock rearing in mixed farming, especially in central western
13
France. It was often noted that the new ploughs and machinery required
large numbers of oxen to work quickly and efficiently. The new ploughs,
such as the Brabant and the Dombasle, were easier to move with four
oxen, and allowed farmers to finish the work quickly before the weather
turned.65 Larger teams of six or eight oxen were common for certain kinds
of work, such as bringing new land into cultivation.66 These types of im
provements were restricted to large farms, as small farmers, either fixed
rent tenants or owner operators, tended to use only cows, since they were
cheaper to feed and produced calves that could be sold after a few months
and milk that was sold in urban markets. These activities were less risky,
but more labour intensive. By contrast, larger farms had a wider selection
of animals oxen, bulls, cows and young animals of more than six months
(e´le`ves) for meat than small farmers could supply.67 Finally, landlords
were reluctant to build the expensive new buildings and stalls that would
have been required by the division of holdings into smaller farms.
Economies of scale were even greater with other activities such as
breed selection and the marketing of the animals, and help explain why
most large me´tairies were part of even larger exploitations or domaines.
Each domaine contained about three to five farms and a small area, called
the ‘reserve’, cultivated either by a landlord’s agent or a sharecropper. In
Mayenne, the domaine often comprised from two to five farms, but many
included more than five.68 In the Limousin, the average size of the
properties studied by Barral was about 140 hectares, and 60 per cent of
them were divided into three to six farms, together with the ‘reserve’.69
The purpose of the reserve was to try out new techniques or crops, to
supervise the selection of animals and to keep the expensive machinery for
the whole domaine.70 Bull breeding was an expensive and risky activity
and was not accessible to most small cultivators, who used young bulls or
bulls that were commonly available.71 The best stabling, pastures and feed
were normally kept for these valuable animals, and in most domaines they
were not tended by sharecroppers, but by a manager (maıˆtre valet), under
the direct supervision of the landlord.
It is only at this level that fixed rent farmers, or fermiers ge´ne´raux,
could be found. These farmers acted as middlemen who provided capital,
essentially the livestock or a share of them, and were in charge of the
supervision of sharecroppers and the marketing of animal products and
grain. Once again economies of scale in marketing explain why these
farmers were often in charge of more than three farms, sometimes owned
by different landlords. Although a single domaine was the norm, a few
were very large, and Barral mentions the case of a fermier who cultivated
35 different farms of over a thousand hectares in total held from four
different landlords.72
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The importance of managerial expertise
Theoretically, the fact that landlords were better endowed than tenants
with an input that was difficult to trade in, namely managerial expertise,
would be another potential justification for using a sharecropping
contract.73 In the case of France, sharecropping contracts included clauses
that allowed the landlord to impose his criteria of general farm manage
ment, even without his tenants’ consent.74 Most decisions that were
related to livestock selection, feeding and marketing were under the close
scrutiny of landlords or their agents. This point was critical in the debates
on the potential advantages (or otherwise) of French sharecropping.
While the tenants and their advocates often argued that the landlords’
guidance was abusive, was sometimes inefficient or shifted land improve
ment costs to them, other writers claimed that it was the main advantage
of the contract.75 For the defenders of the system, these clauses allowed
progressive and wealthy landlords to help their tenants.76 The subject was
the topic of a parliamentary debate concerning the modification of land
tenure in the 1880s, which finally backed the landlords’ case. By contrast,
the 1946 reforms shifted influence to the tenants for the first time.77
As we have seen earlier, the improvements in farming after 1840 were
based on better livestock breeds, new methods of feeding and the intro
duction of forage and artificial pastures. In these cases, landlords or their
agents often had privileged access to market information and could pro
vide better managerial skills. Contemporaries often stressed that the
absence of such direction was a hindrance to improvements.78 In central
and western France this point is particularly important for two reasons.
On the one hand, human capital was probably lower in sharecropping
areas. If we use literacy as an indicator of human capital, the rate of illit
eracy in central France was especially high. The eight French departments
with the highest illiteracy rates in 1872 (an average of 62 per cent of con
scripts illiterate against a national average of 35.3 per cent) coincided with
the highest presence of sharecropping (38.6 per cent against a national
average of 13.1 per cent in 1882).79Moreover, in theLimousin, local records
confirm that sharecroppers had higher illiteracy rates (84 per cent) than
other population groups (78 per cent for other cultivators).80 This corre
lation has been often quoted to show the negative impact of the share
cropping contract.81 But it seems more likely that high levels of illiteracy
were a consequence of rural dispersion, especially high for the inhabitants
of me´tairies.82 Sharecroppers’ access to information was probably more
limited than for tenants of other areas and could be a potential obstacle to
adopting new technology. But if the provision of managerial ability can
justify sharecropping contracts, it is also important that landlords were
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well disposed to play this role. The fact that many landlords were at the
same time predominant members of herd book committees is an indicator
that they were not complete absentees. In 1908, the great majority of the
77 landowners who created the ‘Socie´te´ des e´leveurs de la race Durham
Mancelle ’ in Mayenne were from the area with most sharecroppers.83
Authors more in favour of sharecropping, such as E. Me´plain, Rene´
Musset or the Comte de Tourdonnet, would stress the importance of the
close residence of landlords to their properties, although they often com
plained about their lack of interest.84 But absentee landlords also had the
possibility of renting their land to fermiers ge´ne´raux, or, increasingly after
the First World War, to ‘experts ’, who were agronomists or technicians.
Wage labour, sharecropping and animals
If economies of scale were so important for cattle raising, and landlords
had to impose their will on traditional tenants to introduce farm im
provements, they could perhaps have shifted instead to large scale farm
ing using wage labour. For Augustin Barral and others, large scale direct
farming was a much more efficient way to introduce technological change,
although it met resistance from some absentee landlords.85 The same
author provides examples of large properties of 150 300 hectares in the
Limousin worked directly by their owners using wage labourers. But if
direct cultivation was useful for introducing improvements, landlords
usually shifted to sharecropping afterwards.86 In fact, and unlike in
industrial production, the scope for economies of scale in agriculture was
limited given the monitoring costs of labour.87 Compared to the large
fixed rent farms, with which they were so often compared, sharecropping
farms used fewer wage earners. In contrast to the large farmers who
specialized in grain crops or livestock fattening, cattle raising as practised
in the areas of sharecropping provided greater difficulties for the super
vision of wage labour. First, the possibility of substitution of labour for
capital was much more limited than in grain farming. The higher labour
intensity of production caused by using slow oxen, and the heavy soils,
made the substitution of capital for labour especially difficult because of
the high cost of maintaining draft animals and the rising cost of labour.
Agricultural wages increased by a third in real terms from 1850 to 1885,
and by 40 per cent again from 1885 to 1921.88 Secondly, cattle raising
required a high share of permanent workers, who were much harder to
supervise. Temporary workers, more frequent on the large northern cereal
farms, only required close supervision during the harvest operations.89 By
contrast, the large graziers in Normandy or the Charollais did not require
so much labour because the animals were fattened on natural pastures.
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And third, in the case of mixed farming in large me´tairies, not only was
output more labour intensive, but supervisory skills were crucial to run a
wide range of activities all year round.90 Irrigated pastures needed the sort
of careful and permanent control not required on the fertile pastures in
areas such as Normandy or Charollais. Workers had to be attentive to
avoid overworking the valuable oxen that were reared for meat. Family
workers therefore conferred a real advantage over hired hands, who had
to be supervised and could not be easily shifted from one task to another
in response to changes in the weather or the existence of idle time.91
The problem was how to get a sufficiently large family to work a farm
that was twice as large as the average. If the French peasantry started to
have small families very early, it seems that sharecroppers were the
exception.92 In the 1870s according to Tourdonnet, the average size of a
farm in sharecropping over 24 departments was 47 hectares, and it was
cultivated by six family workers and only one servant.93 Census data from
Haute Vienne (Limousin) indicates that sharecropper families were
slightly larger than other farming families (5.5 members on average,
compared to 4.5 for fixed rent tenants and 3.7 for owner cultivators) but,
adjusted to farm size, the average reached 9.3 in the municipality of
Eyjaux or 7.5 in Jonche`re, where large me´tairies were the norm.94 Even
if these large farms usually required some wage labour, it was usually
limited to one or two servants.95 The farm census of 1946, which provides
details on labour inputs by type of tenure and farm size, shows that even
the largest sharecroppers rarely employed more than two farm servants,
and a lot of them were relatives who received a salary.96 When families
were too small to work the largest farms it was always possible to combine
related households, although the proportion of extended families ruled by
a head of the family was shrinking from the mid nineteenth century.97
Large families allowed the provision of different skills according to gender
and age. In particular children were able to look after the sheep, pigs and
poultry, and do work that was difficult to contract for through the labour
market. However, landlords were probably more interested than their
tenants in selecting the larger families, or in fixing a minimum amount of
work as a clause in the contract.98 Large landlords expressed concern
about the shrinking size of the sharecropper’s family, and about the
breaking of family ties that led younger children to look for non farm
employment.99
I V
The fact that there were advantages for landowners in using share
croppers to cultivate their properties does not mean that the organization
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was straightforward. According to Richardson, ‘ this system does not
solve the question as to what is the best relation in which landlords and
tenants should stand towards each other’.100 Supervising tenants in com
plex systems involving crop rotation, livestock and a variety of products,
even if it was cheaper than contracting wage labourers, was not particu
larly easy. The contracts were normally very complex. While some of the
details are sometimes considered to be examples of the exploitative
character of the contract, or as feudal residues, these were, as we will see,
often more appropriately explained in terms of the high monitoring costs
required to implement the clauses of the contract. There were two par
ticular problems that the contract had to address : the sharing of inputs
and work by both landlord and tenant, and the division of the product.
Input sharing can create problems of moral hazard, but as I have argued,
sharecropping was often a more efficient way to deal with the difficulties
than was fixed rent tenancy. In contrast, the division of the output was a
potential source of cheating that could be sufficiently serious to preclude
the adoption of the contract.
With respect to inputs, the landlords usually provided the land, the
livestock and increasingly a large share of the most expensive machinery.
The tenant in turn supplied all of the permanent labour, usually a share of
the seasonal labour, all hand tools and sometimes a share of the livestock.
Inputs such as fertilizers or seeds were normally shared in halves or in
other proportions usually more favourable for the tenant. Fixed invest
ment such as in liming or buildings was usually financed by landlords,
although tenants had to provide the labour. Allen and Lueck have argued
that the main advantage of sharecropping over fixed rent farming is that it
avoids the transaction costs of supervising the correct use of the landlord’s
inputs.101 Since inputs were shared, sharecroppers were less prone to make
an excessive use of land or to overwork the draught livestock.102 In
addition the landlord could stipulate the amount of fertilizer to be used,
the feed for the livestock and the crop rotation on the arable land.
Share contracts included clauses related to the distribution of pro
duction. Normally the landlord and tenant shared any increase (or
decrease) in the value of the livestock and the proceeds from the sale of
livestock and cereals (rye and increasingly wheat) and any other products
that were divided in kind after the harvest. However, not all products were
divided equally. Forage and root crops were usually fed to the livestock
and the garden produce was for the sharecropper and his own family’s
consumption. For others, the landlord had the right to a fixed amount of
the product, such as a certain number of pigs, poultry, bags of chestnuts
or potatoes and so on. When the output was an annual crop, such as
grapes or grains, it was relatively easy for the landlord or his agent to
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control the harvest. This observation could be extended to rice or olive
production. However, mixed farming allowed for a large variety of pro
ducts : grains, potatoes, fodder, fruit, chestnuts, and so on, and also a
large variety of animal products, meat, poultry, wool, milk, butter, eggs,
etc. If some products were obtained only once a year, other goods such as
fruit or dairy products were more frequent. Cows had to be milked daily,
and the milk could be consumed in different ways fresh, as butter, or fed
to the young cattle. Potential problems of opportunistic behaviour, such
as under reporting the daily production and selling the surplus, were
likely, and explain why sharecroppers were not allowed to produce butter
or milk for the market until the late 1890s, when the development of
butter cooperatives allowed landlords the possibility of securing an
accurate monthly account of production. Contracts were drawn up with
an evident sensitivity to the importance of the transaction costs associated
with the division of output, which explains why the clauses were limited to
the division of only two or three products, namely the most valuable or
the easiest to measure. Garden produce and most of the animal feed were
allowed to be consumed by the sharecroppers or their livestock, but could
never be sold.103 This feature helps explain why sharecropping was often
considered as self sufficient although personal consumption was often not
high. According to the figures of Garidel, the consumption of the farm’s
products by the tenants on five farms in the Allier between 1875 and 1879
was only about 7 to 10.5 per cent of the gross product. 104 In other cases
the landlords were aware of the importance of close and strict monitoring
of the division of production: cattle were normally sold in the presence of
both sides, often in the market and the harvest was indirectly supervised
through the wage labourers employed by the landlord. Other clauses
required fixed payments, such as a bag of potatoes or chestnuts, thirty
eggs, a pound of butter, one or two pigs, to minimize supervision costs.
Transaction costs could also be reduced in other ways. Landlords who
were especially involved in the management of their holdings or their
livestock could reduce their marginal cost of supervision of labour, and
as I showed earlier, the stock usually belonged to them in the region
specialized in cattle raising. Long term contracts or annual renewals over
several generations were other means employed to build up relationships
based on trust that reduced the risk of cheating.105 Collection of data on
the length of contracts is particularly difficult, but it is possible to infer
that the new opportunities for sharecroppers to buy land in the 1880s or
after the First World War would have broken this old relationship, and
reduced the social capital that landlords enjoyed in previous decades.
This question is important from the point of view of whether the con
tract would have suffered from a lack of trust between the two parties.
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Given the complexity of mixed husbandry, and the sharing of decisions
related to the purchase of inputs, investment in building or livestock
selection, the possibility of conflicts was likely to be high. Some clauses
were actually bitterly resented and considered as feudal residues from the
past. In addition, in the Allier and some other areas before the First
World War, most sharecroppers had to pay a fixed amount of money,
l’impoˆt colonique (the tenant tax), of around 10 per cent of the gross
product, to compensate the landlord for any improvements in land pro
ductivity that were not due to the tenant’s efforts.106 The abolition of
l’impoˆt colonique, among other claims, mobilized for the first time a large
number of sharecroppers of the Allier in 1905 and stimulated the creation
of the ‘Fe´de´ration des Travailleurs de la Terre’, a trade union for share
croppers and agricultural labourers. But this kind of conflict was excep
tional in France.107 A possible explanation for the absence of conflict is the
fact that the contract was able to adapt to the rising opportunity cost
of labour. Contracts were modified in order to progressively increase the
tenant’s share of the output during the first half of the twentieth century.
When a law of 1946 made compulsory a reduction of one half to one third
of the total product to be paid to the landlord, many tenants were already
paying roughly this share.108 Thus, the flexibility of adjustments over time,
and the fact that the contract tended to minimize the transaction costs
associated with output measurement, probably compensated for the
potential conflicts between the economic agents.
CONCLUS IONS
In this article I have addressed the question of why certain French land
lords preferred to use sharecropping contracts rather than fixed rent ones.
We have seen that most of these landlords could be found in regions
where specialization in livestock was important, especially in cattle rearing
and meat production. Farmers lacked sufficient physical and human
capital to farm the large holdings. This explains the importance of land
lords’ managerial expertise for the choice of share contracts. However, the
complexity of mixed farming also required a quality of work and certain
organizational skills that would have been too expensive with wage labour.
While sharecropping farmers employed a large share of the servants who
worked in the main sharecropping areas of central and western France,
landowners still preferred to rent their holdings to large families capable
of supplying most of the required labour. Finally, supervising tenants in
complex systems involving crop rotation, livestock rearing and a variety
of other products was not easy, and consequently the contracts carried
complex and detailed clauses. Whereas sharecroppers felt the unfairness
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of many such clauses, most of them served to minimize transaction costs.
In contrast with the traditional view, which favoured fixed rent tenancy
rather than sharecropping for large scale cultivation, sharecropping was,
paradoxically, the agricultural contract that allowed landowners in central
and western France to maintain large scale livestock farming in a context
of increasing numbers of small owner operators and fragmentation of
holdings.
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